Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: A Methodology for Understanding the Enforcement Problem in China by McCabe, Justin
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
Volume 8
Number 1 Pierce Law Review Article 3
December 2009
Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: A
Methodology for Understanding the Enforcement
Problem in China
Justin McCabe
Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Burlington, Vermont
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, Other Languages, Societies, and Cultures
Commons, Rule of Law Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of New Hampshire Law Review by an authorized editor of University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Repository Citation
Justin McCabe, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: A Methodology for Understanding the Enforcement Problem in China, 8 Pierce L.
Rev. 1 (2009), available at http://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr/vol8/iss1/3
File: McCabe Final v.3.doc Created on: 1/24/10 7:11 PM Last Printed: 1/24/10 7:11 PM 
1 
Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: A Methodology for 
Understanding the Enforcement Problem in China 
JUSTIN MCCABE* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I.	   INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 1	  
II.	   PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY................................ 7	  
III.	  	  	   ATTEMPTED IMPLEMENTATIONS OF PATENT LAWS  
 IN CHINA .................................................................................. 12	  
 A.	  Treaty of 1903..................................................................... 13	  
 B.	  Patent Law in the Communist Era: Intermittent Regulations      
of 1950 ................................................................................ 15	  
 C.	  The Current Intellectual Property Implementation ............ 16	  
IV.	  	   TEXTUAL ANALYSIS: U.S. AND CHINESE INTELLECTUAL  
 PROPERTY PROTECTIONS AND PROCEDURES ............................ 19	  
 A.	  Infringement: As Defined and Limitations Thereto ............ 19	  
 B.	  Infringement: Enforcement of Patent Protections.............. 24	  





Intellectual property rights are neither protected nor enforced in 
strict uniformity throughout the world.  However, it can be said that 
in most developed countries, intellectual property is preciously 
guarded, as evidenced by a plethora of intellectual property statutes, 
penalties for infringement, and consistent attempts to convince less- 
developed nations to adopt strong—or stronger—intellectual prop-
erty protections.1  Despite continued vigilance by developed coun-
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Vermont Law School, summa cum laude (2003).  The author is a patent attorney 
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tries in bringing about increased international harmony among intel-
lectual property regimes, some developing countries sustain ques-
tionable enforcement policies.2  What the driving force is behind 
intellectual property enforcement policies—or more appropriately, 
the lack thereof—is a matter of disagreement.3  In order to predict 
whether or not a country that is currently not enforcing its laws will 
enforce them in the future, it is undoubtedly necessary to understand 
the factors driving a country’s current enforcement policy.  For in-
stance, cultural, economic, or political factors, or a combination 
  
views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of 
Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC. 
 1. To enhance protections for their own citizens’ intellectual property, industri-
alized countries have engaged in multinational and bilateral treaties with less de-
veloped nations, attempting to improve and harmonize intellectual property laws.  
For example, membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO) requires the 
assent to several treaties regarding intellectual property and the promulgation of 
laws to provide adequate protections to intellectual property.  See Kirsten M. 
Koepsel, How Do Developed Countries Meet Their Obligations Under Article 67 
of the TRIPS Agreement?, 44 IDEA 167, 168–69 (2004).  There are currently 194 
independent states in the world and 153 of them are members of the WTO.  U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INDEPENDENT STATES IN THE WORLD (2009), 
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS (2008), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e 
/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
 2. See Keshia B. Haskins, Note, Special 301 in China and Mexico: A Policy 
Which Fails to Consider How Politics, Economics, and Culture Affect Legal 
Change Under Civil Law Systems of Developing Countries, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1125, 1128–29 (1999) (noting that China and Mexico 
have many reasons not to enforce their copyright laws, including the profit to be 
obtained, protection of their own citizens from exploitation by industrialized coun-
tries, and a lack of concern for intellectual property generally). 
 3. Compare KONG QINGJIANG, WTO, INTERNATIONALIZATION AND THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIME IN CHINA 5 (2005) (“[T]omorrow’s IPR 
[Intellectual Property Regime] may be no more than a logical extension of the 
political economy of today’s IPR regime.”), with WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL 
A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE 
CIVILIZATION 2 (1995) (“[I]mperial China did not develop a sustained indigenous 
counterpart to intellectual property law, in significant measure because of the 
character of Chinese political culture.”), and XIN REN, TRADITION OF THE LAW 
AND LAW OF THE TRADITION: LAW, STATE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINA 2 
(1997) (noting China’s reluctance to enforce promulgated laws as a vestige of its 
“state-commanded social control efforts”). 
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thereof, may result in stricter enforcement practices, while others 
may discourage or delay them. 
The differences between Chinese and U.S. laws and intellectual 
property policy development illustrate the underlying disparity be-
tween their perspectives on intellectual property rights.  The United 
States is one of the most protective countries concerning intellectual 
property rights and has aggressively sought to improve intellectual 
property protections in China.4  However, despite the United States’ 
continued efforts and China’s enactment of intellectual property 
laws, many still perceive China as one of the largest infringing coun-
tries in the world—illegally appropriating significant amounts of 
protected technology and copyrighted materials.5  While legal com-
mentators have routinely chastised China for its failure to enforce its 
intellectual property laws,6 and have blamed this lack of enforcement 
on a myriad of factors,7 they have not evaluated whether these fac-
tors are truly unique to China or whether they are individually, or in 
the aggregate, the driving force behind China’s lack of enforcement.  
Nor have these commentators seriously addressed the ultimate ques-
tion of whether China’s enforcement practices will improve and 
what that means for intellectual property rights generally. 
To fill this gap in understanding China’s future enforcement 
practices, this paper suggests a methodology for determining 
whether, and to what extent, Chinese culture, as defined by its valua-
tion of intellectual property, is the driving force behind its current 
intellectual property enforcement policy.  The methodology proposes 
that two analyses, one historical and the other functional, provide 
valuable guidance as to the extent and nature of the influence Chi-
  
 4. See ALFORD, supra note 3, at 1 (“China . . . [has] taken major steps designed 
to bring [its] . . . intellectual property laws into close conformity with the expecta-
tions of the U.S. government, which had threatened to impose hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in trade sanctions . . . .”); QINGJIANG, supra note 3, at 3–4 (noting 
pressure on China from western countries, especially the United States). 
 5. See Kate Colpitts Hunter, Here There Be Pirates: How China is Meeting Its 
IP Enforcement Obligations Under TRIPS, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 523, 525 
(2007) (describing extent of China’s piracy). 
 6. See, e.g., id. 
 7. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 3, at 2 (Chinese political culture); QINGJIANG, 
supra note 3, at 5 (political economy); REN, supra note 3, at 2 (social control ef-
forts); Haskins, supra note 2, at 1128–29 (general political expediency). 
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nese culture has on its current enforcement practices.  The historical 
comparison requires an evaluation of past implementations of intel-
lectual property regimes in China with its current implementation.  
The primary purpose of this appraisal is to construct a framework by 
which certain influences, such as Communism and the Cultural Rev-
olution, may be shown, for instance, to have minimal effect on Chi-
na’s implementation of an intellectual property regime because of its 
non-existence at the time of previous attempts to implement an 
intellectual property regime.  In addition, a historical recounting 
should afford insight into the societal understanding of intellectual 
property in China as it existed in prior periods, such as the early 
twentieth century and during the Communist period, and whether it 
is evolving today into a more Western conception. 
The second prong of the methodology focuses on a functional 
comparison of the currently enacted patent laws in China and the 
United States.  This functional comparison highlights differences 
between U.S. and Chinese laws and attributes that influence those 
differences.  A strict functional comparison, however, may have sig-
nificant flaws, especially when, as in the context of intellectual prop-
erty, there is “inadequate theoretical groundwork” for the compari-
son.8  As Xin Ren describes, there are many legal concepts that do 
not exist in traditional Chinese law, and thus “an exegetical approach 
that focuses on an analysis of Chinese written statutes—with refer-
ences from the Western legal categories of presupposition and ter-
minology—has often been applied to determine how these statutes 
might be interpreted in Chinese society.”9  Generally, Ren’s con-
cerns are shared by other comparative theorists.10  However, these 
  
 8. REN, supra note 3, at 7. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers, Gulliver’s Troubled Travels, or the Conun-
drum of Comparative Law, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 161–62 (1998) (book 
review). 
Discerning the meaning of laws requires more than literal comprehension 
of written text.  Every legal system has its own taxonomy or intellectual 
framework in which the language of its laws is embedded.  The full 
meaning of laws can be understood only by viewing laws through the 
prism of the intellectual framework in which they exist.  Traditional com-
parative law usually begins its analysis, however, by choosing a substan-
tive area of law (as defined within one system) and then comparing it to 
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concerns do not render a statutory comparison useless, especially 
when context may be found to bolster the interpretation which is, in 
part, what the previously described historical analysis attempts to 
provide. 
The importance of comparing the laws of two countries, with 
adequate context, also provides an understanding as to the external 
influences on the laws themselves.  As Roger Cotterrell opined: 
[The] law can be considered to express or structure the expe-
riences that make up the essential texture of social life . . . .  
[C]ontext is ‘assumed and reproduced in law as a bearer of 
traditions, or of ideological constructions, or forms of dis-
course.’  Thus, law, to a significant extent, actually consti-
tutes social reality.11 
Therefore, comparing Chinese intellectual property laws to those 
of a developed system, such as the United States, should reveal the 
current extent of various influences on the intellectual property sys-
tem.  In addition, depending on the differences between the current 
implementation of an intellectual property regime, as compared to 
prior attempted implementations, there may be a means to ascertain 
whether stronger enforcement practices are imminent. 
Although many potential influences exist, there are two primary 
reasons to focus on whether or not culture is the driving force behind 
China’s lackluster enforcement practices.  First, studies of develop-
ing countries’ intellectual property systems have stated that there is a 
typical progression for stricter enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.12  Generally, a developing country is a net importer of intel-
  
its supposed counterpart in another legal system.  Comparison through 
this approach necessarily treats the objects being compared as relatively 
independent from the intellectual framework in which they exist.  The 
main problem with a process that abstracts laws from their context is that 
it permits scholars to portend the results of their comparison. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 11. Roger Cotterrell, Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?, 25 
J.L. & SOC’Y 171, 176 (1998) (footnote omitted) (quoting David Nelkon, Beyond 
the Study of “Law and Society”? Henry’s Private Justice and O’Hagan’s The End 
of Law?, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 323, 325 (book review)). 
 12. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY ch. 4 (2000), reprinted in FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., 
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lectual property.13  Therefore, if the country strictly enforced strong 
intellectual property laws, it would severely hamper its economic 
development, as its citizens would be at a disadvantage while com-
peting on a national stage.14  However, as a country becomes more 
powerful economically, thus becoming an exporter of intellectual 
property, the country has greater reason to empower its intellectual 
property system to protect these rights.15  Then, once a country be-
comes a significant exporter of intellectual property, the country will 
also be politically motivated to protect the country’s assets and will 
provide the administrative resources necessary to raise the level of 
enforcement.16  Thus, it is important to not focus on either economic 
or political motivations, as they are generally interdependent and 
will lead toward stronger intellectual property protections.17  In the 
context of China specifically, since its economy is growing substan-
tially and its political machinery has enacted intellectual property 
  
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 
113, 115 (2007); Jing “Brad” Luo & Shubha Ghosh, Protection and Enforcement 
of Well-Known Mark Rights in China: History, Theory and Future, 7 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 119, 119–20 (2009). 
 13. E.g., QINGJIANG, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that in 1984 “China was primar-
ily an importer of technologies, and simple economics dictates it leaving foreign 
technology unprotected”). 
 14. Haskins, supra note 2, at 1128 (“[D]eveloping countries often struggle with 
creating strong intellectual property laws because upon creation of such laws in 
developing countries, industrialized producers appear to gain at the expense of 
consumers of developing countries.” (citing Gabriel Garcia, Comment, Economic 
Development and the Course of Intellectual Property Protection in Mexico, 27 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 701, 708 (1992))); cf. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 634 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) (“Intellectual 
property, despite the name, was not valued for intellectual reasons at all [in the 
early history of the Republic], but because of mercantile and industrial applica-
tions.  As such, this property was not a central concern of the law until the full-
blown factory age” (quoting LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
LAW 257 (2d ed. 1985))). 
 15. QINGJIANG, supra note 3, at 9. 
 16. See id. (stating that as China’s economic situation developed “there was 
strong motivation among China’s leaders and officials to continue the gradual 
broadening of the scope of protection for patented inventions by foreigners, which, 
in the end, eliminated the practice of forced technology transfers”). 
 17. Id. 
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laws that comport with international obligations,18 one would expect 
that in time, China’s enforcement practices would improve. 
Secondly, the reason to focus on culture is that eliminating it as 
one of the driving forces will enable a negative inference that the 
enforcement regime in China will improve naturally—that is, assum-
ing that there is not an economical meltdown or political unrest.  In 
addition, if culture does strongly influence the enforcement of its 
intellectual property regime, an analysis of the scope of China’s pro-
tection may offer insights as to the appropriate strength and necessity 
of industrialized intellectual property laws.19 
II. PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Intellectual property laws protect intangible property, which is, 
in a broad sense, ideas.20  Intellectual property laws generally, and 
patent laws specifically, are “attempt[s] to balance the rights of the 
community against the individual interests of inventors.”21  Unsur-
prisingly, different societies have chosen to balance these two inter-
ests differently.22  Generally, the first real patent “system”23 is 
  
 18. Andrew Jacobs & Bettina Wassener, China’s Growth Picks Up Speed But 
Raises Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, at B6, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/business/global/23yuan.html; see ALFORD, 
supra note 3, at 1. 
 19. There is evidence that U.S. intellectual property protections have gone too 
far; several recent court decisions have scaled back on United States patent hold-
ers’ rights.  See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) 
(limiting extraterritorial reach of 35 U.S.C § 271 (2006)); KSR Int’l Co. v. Tele-
flex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416–18 (2007) (increasing the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 103 to 
minimize the patentability of obvious improvements over the prior art); In re Bil-
ski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (limiting patentable processes), 
cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). 
 20. See ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 12, at 6. 
 21. MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 119.  
 22. See Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 455 (“Foreign conduct is [generally] the 
domain of foreign law, and in the area here involved, in particular, foreign law 
may embody different policy judgments about the relative rights of inventors, 
competitors, and the public in patented inventions.”) (alteration in original) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); G. GREGORY LETTERMAN, BASICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166 (2001) (“The various gov-
ernments of the countries of the world may—and have—come to very different 
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thought to be a creation of the Venetians during the Renaissance pe-
riod.24  This first system mirrors the conventional patent systems 
today—with requirements for registration (novelty and usefulness), a 
set duration of monopoly afforded the inventor, and a path to remedy 
infringement by others.25  However, in contrast to the U.S. patent 
system, the Venetians reserved to the Republic the right to use the 
invention without compensating the inventor.26 
The Venetian system is just one example among many of various 
balances struck between the community and the inventor.  Impor-
tantly, every sovereign has the right to strike or not to strike its own 
balance.27  While small differences may be understandable, not strik-
ing a balance and therefore not granting intellectual property protec-
tions or not enforcing them, is not as unusual as it may seem from 
the outset.  “[P]rotections provided to [intellectual property] are 
granted by governments as an award of a legal proprietary right to 
the creators as a compensation and inducement for what they have 
created.”28  However, this award comes at a price to society.   
First, the government creates a limited monopoly for the inven-
tor.29  “Under generally accepted economic theories of competition 
and the efficiencies of a market economy, monopolies are anathema 
  
conclusions regarding the minimum levels of inducement [to disclose inventions] 
that need be offered.”). 
 23. But see MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 117 n.3 (citing Malcolm Frumkin, 
Early History of Patents for Invention, 26 TRANSACTIONS NEWCOMEN SOC’Y 47 
(1947) (claiming that the first patents may have been granted during the Byzantine 
Empire)). 
 24. Id. at 118. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Annette Kur, Applicable Law: An Alternative Proposal for International 
Regulation—The Max-Planck Project on International Jurisdiction and Choice of 
Law, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 951, 954 (2005) (“[The m]ost important among [the 
policy reasons] is the notion that the territoriality and lex protectionis principles 
are best suited to safeguard national legislatures’ freedom to regulate intellectual 
property matters having an impact on their territories . . . .”). 
 28. LETTERMAN, supra note 22, at 4. 
 29. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 523 (1972), 
superseded by statute on other grounds, Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 
Pub. Law No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383, as recognized in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
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and most efforts to create or maintain them are thwarted by action of 
law.”30  Second, it is generally in the sovereign’s interest to dissemi-
nate and utilize ideas—“just as the fullest dissemination of ideas is 
deemed essential to a healthy scientific inquiry and to public democ-
ratic discourse.”31  Lastly, a country, depending on its economy, po-
litical situation, educational and manufacturing capabilities, and cul-
ture, may not have the impetus to create intellectual property laws 
that would significantly harm its citizens or would be contrary to its 
view of intellectual property generally.32  
These aforementioned concerns may be reinforced by the lack of 
“practical, rigorous, scientific examination of the actual economic 
consequences of the creation of [intellectual property] rights when 
compared with their absence which would irrefutably demonstrate 
that [intellectual property] rights are of public benefit.”33  Thus, even 
when the government creates patent rights, it likely creates the rights 
  
 30. LETTERMAN, supra note 22, at 7. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Haskins, supra note 2, at 1128–29 (noting that China and Mexico have 
many reasons not to enforce their copyright laws, which includes the profit to be 
obtained, protection of its own citizens from exploitation by industrialized coun-
ties, and a lack of concern for intellectual property generally). 
 33. LETTERMAN, supra note 22, at 8.  But see John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, 
The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Toward Property Rights in Invention and Dis-
covery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 735, 736 (1999) (“Although knowledgeable 
observers have had their differences about whether the role of patents in encourag-
ing technological advancement and commercialization outweighs their arguably 
anticompetitive exclusionary effects, today’s consensus is that the benefits of an 
appropriately tailored patent system more than counterbalance its costs.”); ROBERT 
J. SHAPIRO & KEVIN A. HASSETT, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 5–6 (2005), available at http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/Intel-
lectualPropertyReport-October2005.pdf.  Shapiro and Hassett argue that 
economists have long understood that growth is linked to innovation and linking 
innovation to the strength of intellectual property laws.  Id.  For example, “[f]rom 
1980 to 2002, the developing East Asian economies achieved growth averaging 
more than 7.4 percent per year, and the developing South Asian economies grew 
by an average of more than 5.4 percent annually.  By contrast, Latin American 
economies with more restrictive foreign-investment policies and lax intellectual 
property protections grew by less than 2.5 percent per year over the same period.”  
Id. 
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begrudgingly and will attempt to limit the inventor’s benefits in or-
der to achieve the appropriate balance for its society.34 
The theoretical underpinnings of patent law also present chal-
lenges to countries attempting to devise an intellectual property pro-
tection system.  A patent, offered by the community, gives an inven-
tor an exclusive monopoly on the use and sale of her invention for a 
limited duration, in exchange for the publication of the invention.35  
The common thought is that 
inventions are public goods that are costly to make and that 
are difficult to control once they are released into the world.  
As a result, absent patent protection, inventors will not have 
sufficient incentive to invest in creating, developing, and 
marketing new products.  Patent law provides a market-
driven incentive to invest in innovation, by allowing the in-
ventor to appropriate the full economic rewards of her inven-
tion.36 
Thus, patent law “is intended to perform three functions: (1) to 
stimulate inventive activity; (2) to encourage investment in the prod-
ucts of inventive activity[;] and (3) to disseminate technical informa-
tion to the public.”37  However, at the crux of patent law is that the 
sovereign must decide to provide a right of ownership to a person 
who comes up with an idea.38  This grant by the sovereign is unique 
when compared to conventional property rights.39 
  
 34. See LETTERMAN, supra note 22, at 8.  
 35. See ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 12, at 7-8. 
 36. MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 127. 
 37. ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 12, at 7. 
 38. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 238 (James Madison) (photo. reprint 2002) 
(E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“The right to useful inventions, seems . . . to belong to the 
inventors.”). 
 39. In socialist and communist countries, the comparison does not surface be-
cause property in these societies is generally treated communally—there are no 
rights for the state to determine or protect.  See ALFORD, supra note 3, at 56–57 
(“[T]he Soviet model reflected traditional Chinese attitudes toward intellectual 
property . . . with regard to the belief that in inventing or creating, individuals were 
engaged in social activities that drew on a repository of knowledge that belonged 
to all members of society.”). 
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Typically, the sovereign’s involvement in property disputes is to 
ensure a means for maintaining control by the rightful owner of the 
property in question, with the premise being that only one person can 
“exercise exclusive and full control over an item of tangible prop-
erty.”40  In contrast, patent rights only allow for the exclusion of oth-
ers to the idea—an idea that can be fully utilized by anyone besides 
the inventor without diminishing the ability of the inventor to use the 
idea.41  Thus, the inventor is not directly “harmed” by others using 
the invention, but is placed in a precarious position of either “(a) not 
commercially exploit[ing] the idea in order to maintain its secrecy or 
(b) to use it and thereby share it with all others without receiving any 
compensation for the use by others of the idea.”42   
Given the unique features of patent law and its policy goals, it is 
difficult to analogize to more traditional property law concepts.  
Thus, it is reasonable to presume that it is harder for developing 
countries to rationalize completely, the benefits of a strong patent 
law system.  If one tried to find a parallel to a more traditional prop-
erty right, one could argue that a country’s patent law is akin to pro-
tection offered to keep tangible property from trespass.  However, 
while actions of trespass and infringement protect against the use of 
property by others, patent infringement never deprives the inventor 
of the idea’s use.  In addition, the primary policy behind patent laws 
is to promote and foster further invention—not to ensure the inven-
tor maintains ownership.43  While attempting to analogize intellec-
tual property concepts to the law of trespass is just one possible 
comparison, the challenges of analogizing to traditional Western 
property law constructs are evident.  For societies without Western 
conceptions of property law, one can imagine that there may be even 
  
 40. LETTERMAN, supra note 22, at 2. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Although many patent systems, including the U.S. system, do recognize an 
ownership interest in patentable ideas, other systems, including China’s, offer 
rewards to inventors rather than a limited monopoly.  See Implementing Regula-
tions of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China R. 74 (promulgated by 
the State Council of the P.R.C., June 15, 2001, effective July 1, 2001), 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/ (follow “Implementing Regulations of 
the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 3, 
2009) [hereinafter Implementing Regulations]. 
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greater difficulty rationalizing the implementation of an intellectual 
property law regime.44 
Despite these concerns, most countries have implemented an in-
tellectual property regime with varying degrees of success and with 
the purpose of participating in the global economy.45  However, past 
implementations of an intellectual property regime in China have not 
succeeded, even though China has an extensive history of ingenuity 
and creativity.46  Thus, understanding the influences that doomed 
prior attempts should indicate the possibility of success of the cur-
rent implementation process.  In addition, appraising prior imple-
mentations should allow for a reduction in the possible factors influ-
encing the current lack of intellectual property law enforcement in 
China.  Notably, there have been numerous attempts to implement an 
intellectual property regime in China,47 thus only a few attempts will 
be evaluated here, and a more extensive evaluation of all past intel-
lectual property regime implementations would be undertaken using 
the methodology proposed. 
III. ATTEMPTED IMPLEMENTATIONS OF PATENT LAWS IN CHINA 
The United States has protected intellectual property rights since 
the founding of the country48 and Western Europe developed intel-
lectual property rights hundreds of years prior to the establishment of 
the U.S. system.49  In contrast, China reintroduced intellectual prop-
erty as a form of property in the 1980s,50 with the adoption of spe-
cific patent law provisions in 1984.51  Prior to this resurgence, there 
had been numerous attempts by the Chinese government, either 
  
 44. See ALFORD, supra 3, at 2–3.  
 45. See Allison & Lin, supra note 33, at 736–37.  
 46. Id. at 742. 
 47. See infra Part III. 
 48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 39, at 
238–39 (stating the obvious—to Madison at least—benefits of intellectual prop-
erty protections). 
 49. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 118 (discussing the Venetian system in 
the 1400s). 
 50. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 532. 
 51. QINGJIANG, supra note 3, at 3. 
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through trade negotiations or through the promulgation of laws, to 
implement an intellectual property regime.52 
A. Treaty of 1903 
In the nineteenth century, foreign nations, such as the United 
States and Great Britain, attempted, through treaty negotiations, to 
protect their citizens from intellectual property infringement by Chi-
nese citizens.53  Unsurprisingly, China did not assent to these treaties 
voluntarily and in most cases, the treaties were patently unfair to 
Chinese nationals.54  The first bilateral patent treaty between the 
United States and China, signed in 1903, evidences this perception.55  
At the time of its ratification, it was deemed as “[undoubtedly] the 
most important convention made by the United States with any Ori-
ental country.”56  The Treaty of 1903, ratified without dissent in the 
U.S. Senate, accomplished many major goals—two of which were 
intellectual property ones—“the extension of the United States inter-
national copyright laws to China, and the promise from China to 
establish a patent office in which the inventions of citizens of the 
United States may be protected.”57  Notably, the treaty provided only 
patent protection for American citizens: “[t]he terms of the treaty 
called for China to grant a limited term of patent protection to all 
American citizens holding U.S. patents, assuming the product to be 
protected was lawful to sell in China and did not copy previous in-
ventions of Chinese nationals.”58   
However, despite these actual inequities, there were tremendous 
economic and political advantages for China to sign the treaty.  The 
beginning of the 1900s in China is described as a period of signifi-
cant social disorder and a period of growing unrest by foreign mer-
chants, resulting from unregulated infringement of foreign goods and 
  
 52. See Allison & Lin, supra note 33, at 745–52 (discussing various implementa-
tions throughout the twentieth century). 
 53. Id. at 746. 
 54. See generally QINGJIANG, supra note 3, at 6. 
 55. Id. at 5 & 13 n.3. 
 56. Treaty with China Ratified, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1903, at 1.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Allison & Lin, supra note 33, at 747. 
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trademarks.59  To combat these pressures, China sought to appease 
foreign governments by negotiating agreements for the protection of 
intellectual property.60  To improve the economic conditions, Chi-
nese officials believed it vitally important to secure exports to West-
ern countries and Japan.61  In fact, Chinese officials believed “that a 
market of 200 million existed in the West and Japan for their prod-
ucts [and therefore] agreed to grant foreigners [intellectual property] 
protection in order to secure such protection [abroad] . . . for its sub-
jects.”62   
The signing of the Treaty of 1903 also sought to quell political 
unrest and to move China forward in the eyes of the world.  One of 
the primary interests in the negotiations with these foreign powers 
was to “underscor[e] China’s sovereign equality as a first step in 
breaking down extraterritoriality.”63  Thus, there were both eco-
nomic and political motivations for putting forth a workable and en-
forceable intellectual property regime. 
The perceived need for implementation of an intellectual prop-
erty regime in the early 1900s parallels the current justification and 
rationale for its implementation in China; however, two critical fea-
tures prevented its effective execution.  First, the treaties were writ-
ten too vaguely to be effective, leaving out significant details.  The 
Treaty of 1903 “indicated that [intellectual property] protection 
would only commence after the Chinese government had established 
a patent office and adopted a patent law,” without specifying a re-
quired date for performance or providing any interim measures.64  
Second, the Chinese, at this point in their history, “were unlikely to 
  
 59. See ALFORD, supra note 3, at 35–36. 
 60. See id. at 36. 
 61. Id. at 37. 
 62. Id. at 37 (last alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and footnote 
omitted). 
 63. Id.  Extraterritoriality in this context means the imposition of foreign law on 
Chinese citizens by a foreign power in China.  See generally id. at 33.  Foreign 
intellectual property holders, prior to these negotiated agreements found that the 
only way to effectuate their rights in China was to resort to the offices in China 
that were under the government’s control.  Id. at 35.  An example would be the 
Imperial Maritime Customs Service that had been controlled by the British since 
its inception in 1854.  Id.  
 64. Id. at 38. 
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have had any corresponding mental conception,” of intellectual 
property.65  Apparently, these two features combined to doom the 
first attempt at patent law and while the failure to adequately lay out 
the principles of patent law has likely been addressed by China’s 
current patent law, the second flaw—the lack of understanding—
appears to subsist.66 
B. Patent Law in the Communist Era: Intermittent Regulations of 
1950 
Communism in China began to become a true political force in 
the 1945–1949 time period, when Communists battled the National-
ist party for control of Chinese politics.67  “Even prior to the Com-
munist formation of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) in 
1949, the Communists had for several decades created Soviet-like 
systems in the areas they controlled.”68  Communist policies gener-
ally treated property, including intangible property, as not available 
to individual ownership.69  Thus, intellectual property was to be 
shared for the good of the community.70  Commentators have noted 
that “[i]n the area of intellectual property law, the Soviet model 
proved more accessible to China than those used [in the past].  In 
large measure this was because of the ways in which the values that 
underlay the Soviet model reflected traditional Chinese attitudes to-
ward intellectual property.”71  China adopted, through provisional 
regulations in 1950, the Soviet “two-track” approach.72  As de-
scribed by Allison and Lin: 
The law’s “first track” discouraged creation of property own-
ership in the invention, but instead called for the award of 
  
 65. Allison & Lin, supra note 33, at 747. 
 66. See QINGJIANG, supra note 3, at 134 n.17 (“Statistics show that the Japanese, 
Americans, and Germans respectively fill out more than 400,000, 200,000, and 
150,000 patent applications a year at home and abroad.  In 2000, China received 
only 25,346 domestic patent applications and 30,343 foreign ones.”). 
 67. Allison & Lin, supra note 33, at 748. 
 68. Id. at 749. 
 69. Id. at 743–44, 749. 
 70. Id. at 749. 
 71. ALFORD, supra note 3, at 56. 
 72. Allison & Lin, supra note 33, at 749. 
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“certificates of invention” to creators of notable inventions. . 
. .  The government held ownership of the intangible property 
rights in the invention and the corresponding right to exploit 
and disseminate it. . . .   
The patent law’s “second track” provided for issuance of 
a true patent to the inventor, carrying with it the right to re-
ceive royalties from the invention’s use. . . .  However, even 
those few inventions eligible for a patent were subject to state 
confiscation, entitling the inventor only to a certificate, if the 
government determined that the invention “concerned na-
tional security, or ‘affected the welfare of the great majority 
of people.’”73 
Politically, this policy more closely adhered to traditional Chi-
nese conceptions of the dissemination of information and provided a 
state control structure that allowed for a small group to exercise 
power to benefit society as a whole.74  However, unlike the Soviet 
system, which crafted the second track of the two-track system to 
appease Western investors and promote foreign investment, the pur-
pose of China’s implementation was to focus on “national recon-
struction.”75  As a result, despite the fact that there was an adminis-
trative system in place to carry out the patent law, the state main-
tained so much discretionary control over the patent process that 
intellectuals and engineers did not use the system to acquire patent 
protection. 76 
C. The Current Intellectual Property Implementation 
In more recent times, China has attempted to develop a system of 
intellectual property rights and protections, generally forced upon 
them by Western countries such as the United States in order to ef-
fectuate their own intellectual property policies.77  China’s system 
  
 73. Id. at 749–50 (footnotes omitted) (quoting ALFORD, supra note 3, at 58). 
 74. ALFORD, supra note 3, at 57. 
 75. Id. at 58. 
 76. See Allison & Lin, supra note 33, at 751 (noting that from 1950 to 1958 
China only issued six certificates and four patents). 
 77. Hunter, supra note 5, at 526; see also QINGJIANG, supra note 3, at 3–4 (stat-
ing that the United States has tried to pressure China into expanding its scope of 
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has undergone numerous changes and enhancements since the first 
promulgation of the code protecting intellectual property rights (the 
details of China’s intellectual property regime are discussed further 
below).78  However, even with these changes the fledging patent 
program has not provided enough protection for some intellectual 
property advocates.79  In addition, there exist streams of data indicat-
ing that blatant copying has not been curtailed despite the implemen-
tation of the current intellectual property regime.80 
While China began to implement its current iteration of intellec-
tual property rights with patent laws drafted in 1979 and subsequent 
enactment of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China in 
1984,81 China’s current patent protections have been involuntary.82  
Upon China’s acceptance to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001, it had to also agree to implement patent provisions that 
comported with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS).83  China has largely enacted the 
provisions necessary to comply with TRIPS,84 including detailed 
provisions for enforcement, yet criticism abounds because the en-
  
intellectual property protection).  See generally LETTERMAN, supra note 22, at 167 
(“[E]conomic and diplomatic pressures brought to bear by the wealthy major trad-
ing countries and by important private foreign investors and trading partners have 
induced many countries otherwise disinclined to adopt more extensive, more pro-
tective, and more effectively enforced patent laws to do so”). 
 78. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 557. 
 79. See generally id. (discussing whether China’s implementation of the TRIPS 
agreement has affected its perceived failure to enforce intellectual property rights). 
 80. See Candace S. Friel, Note, The High Cost of Global Intellectual Property 
Theft: An Analysis of Current Trends, the TRIPS Agreement, and Future Ap-
proaches to Combat the Problem, 7 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 209, 211 
(2007) (discussing China’s infringement impact). 
 81. See QINGJIANG, supra note 3, at 7; Hunter, supra note 5, at 532–33. 
 82. See ALFORD, supra note 3, at 112 (“[T]he U.S. government repeatedly 
threatened the PRC with massive and unprecedented trade sanctions if China did 
not promise to devise legal protection . . . to America’s liking.”). 
 83. Cynthia Smith, Note, A Practical Guide to Chinese Patent Law, 29 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 643, 644–45 (2005). 
 84. Id. at 645 (citing DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 417–18 (2003)). 
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forcement of patent rights has been insufficient.85  Notably, although 
economic conditions in China have tremendously improved, and 
political leaders have “realized that their economy must modernize 
by adopting fundamental market-based precepts or else face ultimate 
economic dysfunction,”86 a Western conception of intellectual prop-
erty appears not to have taken hold in China.87  Thus, the question 
remains whether or not the current implementation will avoid the 
shortfalls of the previous attempts. 
Unfortunately, the current implementation bears some of the 
hallmarks of the two aforementioned failed implementations.  For 
instance, the Treaty of 1903 was largely ineffective because, as is the 
case currently, the Chinese government provided intellectual prop-
erty laws not on their own impetus, but with Western encourage-
ment.88  Granted, the Chinese government believed, as it likely does 
today, that it was both politically and economically important, but 
those influences were not enough to change the traditional concep-
tions of intellectual property that were consistent with Confucian 
ideas of property rights.89  In addition, while the current implementa-
tion contains, as will be discussed more below, the administration 
and laws necessary to implement an intellectual property regime, 
China’s patent laws have also included significant governmental 
control over inventions—control provisions that appear to parallel 
the Intermittent Regulations of the 1950s.90  When these factors are 
considered along with the perpetual infringement occurring in China, 
there appears to be ample evidence that, despite the hope of better 
enforcement in China, the foundation for real change in Chinese cul-
ture has not been laid. 
  
 85. Brigitte Binkert, Comment, Why the Current Global Intellectual Property 
Framework Under TRIPS Is Not Working, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 143, 149 
(2006). 
 86. Allison & Lin, supra note 33, at 787. 
 87. See QINGJIANG, supra note 3, at 129 (describing the low awareness of the 
intellectual property regime in China). 
 88. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 526. 
 89. See ALFORD, supra note 3, at 56–57. 
 90. See supra Part III.B. 
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Of course, China has undertaken other attempts to implement an 
intellectual property system in the past,91 and thus, a complete un-
derstanding of the failures of these implementations may or may not 
support the contention that Chinese attitudes toward intellectual 
property have not changed.  In addition, more information regarding 
the economic and political situations periods evaluated would also 
indicate whether or not the comparison between those implementa-
tions and the current one are accurate.  However, based on this initial 
historical analysis, and the following functional analysis, Chinese 
culture may be considered a significant influence on the implementa-
tion of its intellectual property regime. 
IV. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS: U.S. AND CHINESE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTIONS AND PROCEDURES 
A complete understanding of the differences between Chinese 
and U.S. patent law requires both an appreciation of when an in-
fringement occurs and how the process will aid a patent holder 
whose patent has been infringed.   
A. Infringement: As Defined and Limitations Thereto 
Infringement, broadly defined, is an act of “encroachment or 
trespass on a right or privilege.”92  In the world of intellectual prop-
erty, infringement is more specifically defined as “[a]n act that inter-
feres with one of the exclusive rights of a patent, copyright, or 
trademark owner.”93  Direct infringement under U.S. law encom-
passes most acts that would interfere with the rights granted to the 
patent owner.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) states: “Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or im-
  
 91. See, e.g., Embassy of the United States, IPR Toolkit—Patents, 
http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/iprpatent.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2009) 
(stating that the first patent law in China was developed in 1889 and that intellec-
tual property rights may be traced back to at least the Tang Dynasty in 618–907 
AD). 
 92. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1161 (1993). 
 93. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 796 (8th ed. 2004). 
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ports into the United States any patented invention during the term 
of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”94 
In addition to the broad definition of infringement in U.S. law, a 
person can be held vicariously liable for infringement or found to 
have induced or contributed to infringement of a U.S. patent.95  The 
practical effect of these provisions is to allow for a wide range of 
potential infringers and infringing activities, which in turn strength-
ens the right of the patent holder. 
Similarly, China grants to the patent holder exclusive rights and 
provides a broadly worded law defining infringement in Article 11 
of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China: 
[N]o entity or individual may, without the authorization of 
the patentee, exploit the patent, that is, make, use, offer to 
sell, sell or import the patented product, or use the patented 
process, and use, offer to sell, sell or import the product di-
rectly obtained by the patented process, for production or 
business purposes.96 
A comparison with the U.S. counterpart reveals no sharp distinc-
tions, but obviously, interpretations of each country’s law may vary.  
For instance, China’s proscription on “use, offer to sell, sell or im-
port the product directly obtained by the patented process,” is argua-
bly broader than the U.S. counterpart, which only provides this pro-
tection “if the court finds . . . that a substantial likelihood exists that 
the product was made by the patented process.”97  These interpreta-
tive questions aside, the basic infringement provisions appear very 
similar.  However, differences between the two laws are apparent 
when the scope of infringement—and more precisely, who may be 
liable—is more acutely evaluated.  For instance, there is no textual 
counterpart in Chinese patent law that would find a basis of liability 
  
 94. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 95. Id. § 271(c). 
 96. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 11 (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985) 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/ (follow “Patent Law of the People's 
Republic of China” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Patent Law 
of China]. 
 97. 35 U.S.C. § 295(1). 
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for vicarious, contributory, or the inducement of infringement.  
While these bases of liability are arguably peripheral to the scope of 
patent protection, U.S. patent holders have used these sources to 
more fully protect their patent rights from tactics employed by in-
fringers.98 
In addition to the narrower scope of liability offered under the 
Chinese patent law system, another distinction is that China has in-
cluded defenses to infringement that are unavailable in the United 
States.99  In the United States, there are few specific defenses to in-
fringement.  There are judicially created defenses, such as experi-
mental use,100 inequitable conduct,101 or patent misuse,102 which 
have generally been justified on public policy grounds.  Statutorily 
described defenses are set out in 35 U.S.C. §§ 273 and 282.103  Sec-
tion 273 provides the very narrow defense of prior use of a business 
method patent.104  The most commonly used defenses to infringe-
ment are encompassed in § 282, which allows an individual to make 
the argument that the patented claims105 are invalid.106  Invalidity 
may be established through bars to patentability, such as a finding of 
non-patentable subject matter,107 prior public use,108 or that the pat-
  
 98. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 
670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that contributory infringement, while providing 
an alternative basis for liability, is predicated on a finding of direct infringement). 
 99. See infra notes 118–21, 124 and accompanying text. 
100. See generally MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 321–25. 
101. See generally id. at 325–331. 
102. See generally id. at 331–337. 
103. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 273(b), 282 (2006). 
104. Id. § 273(b) (stating that patents, which claim a method of doing or conduct-
ing business only, may not be enforced against certain prior users). 
105. See id. § 101 (stating that patent claims are essentially the metes and bounds 
of an invention and detail what the “new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement” that an inven-
tor believes is his or her invention). 
106. See § 282(2) (invalidity based on prior art); § 282(3) (invalidity based on 
failure to describe the invention clearly and with sufficiency). 
107. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (limiting paten-
table processes), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). 
108. Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 1448, 1452 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (holding that inventor’s patent was invalid due to prior public sale). 
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ented invention should not have been patented in the first place due 
to already patented prior art109 or the obviousness110 of the invention. 
In general, Chinese patent laws encompass many of the same de-
fenses that are available in the United States with regards to statutory 
bars to patentability involving prior art, failures in adherence to the 
patent process, or statutory bars to patentability.111  However, the 
Chinese patent law system provides additional statutory defenses to 
infringement claims with vague limitations.  Chief among these de-
fenses is the general provision that prohibits the patenting of an in-
vention “that is contrary to the laws of the State or social morality or 
that is detrimental to public interest.”112  This nebulous and possibly 
ad hoc determination may invalidate patent rights previously at-
tained in order to more fully promote, in the administrative agency 
or judiciary’s determination, “the development and innovation of 
science and technology, for meeting the needs of the construction of 
socialist modernization.”113  China also reserves the right, when an 
invention “is of great significance to the interest of the State or to the 
  
109. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (“[I]nvalidity by anticipation requires that the four corners of a single, 
prior art document describe every element of the claimed invention, either ex-
pressly or inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice 
the invention without undue experimentation.”). 
110. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 422 (2007) (combining prior 
art references to hold that respondent’s patent was invalid for obviousness); Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1966) (holding the peti-
tioner’s patent invalid on the basis of obviousness).  
111. See generally Implementing Regulations, supra note 43, at ch. IV.  Note, 
however, that under Chinese law, the request for invalidity of a patent is handled 
in a separate proceeding from the infringement proceeding.  See id. at R. 82. 
112. Patent Law of China, supra note 96, at art. 5; cf. id. at art. 45 (“Where . . . 
any entity or individual considers that the grant of the said patent right is not in 
conformity with the relevant provisions of this Law, it or he may request the Pat-
ent Reexamination Board to declare the patent right invalid.”). 
113. Id. at art. 1; see KARLA C. SHIPPEY, A SHORT COURSE IN INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROTECTING YOUR BRANDS, MARKS, 
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND RELATED RIGHTS WORLDWIDE 123 (2002) 
(“[T]he application and enforcement of laws related to individual IP rights is 
somewhat unpredictable and can depend on sudden shifts in state ideology.”). 
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public interest” and is in need of spreading and application, to allow 
for exploitation of the invention by “designated entities.”114 
In addition to the state interest defenses, Chinese law authorizes 
two innocent infringer defenses unknown to U.S. law.  One of these 
defenses authorizes an infringer who “before the date of filing of the 
application for patent . . . has already made the identical product, 
used the identical process, or made necessary preparations for its 
making or using [to] continue[] to make or use it within the original 
scope only.”115  This defense is akin to one found in U.S. trademark 
law, which allows someone who has established a trademark in a 
geographic area to maintain the use of that mark if another entity 
registers the mark nationally.116  However, there is no similar de-
fense that allows for continued use in spite of actual infringement in 
U.S. patent law—a prior user of an invention may not be liable as an 
infringer, but only because the patent is invalid based on the prior 
public use.117 
A second innocent infringer defense under Chinese law allows 
that 
[a]ny person who, for production and business purposes, uses 
or sells a patented product or a product that was directly ob-
tained by using a patented process, without knowing that it 
was made and sold without the authorization of the patentee, 
shall not be liable to compensate for the damage of the pat-
  
114. Patent Law of China, supra note 96, at arts. 48–55.  The United States may 
use any invention covered by a U.S. patent without getting a license.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1498 (2006).  However, the concern about the Chinese system appears to 
rest in the perception that the United States will use its march-in rights more judi-
ciously given China’s past actions and socialist tendencies. 
115. Patent Law of China, supra note 96, at art. 63(2).  Notably, this defense is 
similar, but much larger in scope than 35 U.S.C. § 273, which is limited only to 
business method patents.  See 35 U.S.C. § 273(b). 
116. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 686–87 (citing Weiner King, Inc. v. 
Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). 
117. See Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting appellant’s claim of prior use and noting that “in order 
to invalidate a patent based on prior knowledge or use, that knowledge or use must 
have been available to the public”). 
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entee if he can prove that he obtains the product from a le-
gitimate source.118 
The complete scope of this defense is unclear.  Apparently, how-
ever, it explicitly rules out a damage award for a patent holder whose 
product has been infringed upon mistakenly, but possibly does not 
preclude an injunctive remedy.  Nonetheless, if this provision is in-
terpreted broadly, it would provide a substantial basis of relief for 
potential infringers who do not make a patented product, but igno-
rantly sell or use it.  It may create a perverse incentive, because this 
type of infringer would not be under an obligation to, and may not 
undertake, an investigation of its suppliers because the only penalty 
is a possible order to desist in selling or using the patented product. 
B. Infringement: Enforcement of Patent Protections 
“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of 
his patent.”119  This basic statement underscores the approach of the 
United States toward patent rights—so long as an inventor has se-
cured a patent in the United States, the inventor can effectuate his 
rights through a civil proceeding in any of the federal district 
courts.120   
Although the scope of infringement is limited to territorial prin-
ciples—the infringement must have substantial contacts in the Unit-
ed States121—a patent holder has significant protections that will be 
enforced by the judiciary when prompted.  There is no need to seek 
the other party out to try to reach a settlement or allow for the in-
fringer to license the product from the patentee.122  In essence, no 
  
118. Patent Law of China, supra note 96, at art. 63. 
119. 35 U.S.C. § 281. 
120. Federal district courts are courts of original jurisdiction and will hear all 
intellectual property cases in the first instance.  28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).  However, all 
appeals from the judgment of a district court go to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.  See id. § 1295. 
121. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (limiting 
extraterritorial reach of 35 U.S.C § 271). 
122. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (“Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention 
and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States . . . .”) (emphasis added).  This is not to say that these situations do not oc-
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one but the patent holder has a right to the invention unless author-
ized by the patent holder.  In contrast, Chinese enforcement provi-
sions have a different character and emphasis—one that arguably 
mandates negotiations by the parties prior to legal action and also 
allows for compulsory licensing under certain circumstances. 
The Chinese patent system has developed a prescribed approach 
to patent disputes.  Chinese law requires that “[w]here a dispute 
arises as a result of the exploitation of a patent without the authoriza-
tion of the patentee, that is, the infringement of the patent right of the 
patentee, it shall be settled through consultation by the parties.”123  
Thus, the first step in resolving a patent dispute in the Chinese sys-
tem is to engage the infringer and attempt to settle the dispute with-
out resorting to litigation. 
Interestingly, although this provision uses the word shall, the 
next sentence of the law appears to severely impinge on this mandate 
by indicating that “[w]here the parties are not willing to consult with 
each other or where the consultation fails” the patentee may seek 
either a legal or administrative determination of the infringer’s liabil-
ity.124  Besides the requirement of negotiation, however, it appears 
that an administrative or judicial proceeding will be conducted in 
much the same way as it would be in the United States, and similar 
remedies are available. 
As in U.S. patent law, the scope of protection offered a Chinese 
patentee is determined by the claims in the patent,125 and subject to 
any defenses to infringement.126  An infringer may move to stay the 
proceedings in order to have the patent invalidated, but the court 
may not grant the stay if it determines the claim of invalidity is 
frivolous.127   
  
cur.  Settlements are negotiated, and even encouraged, by the judiciary.  See, e.g., 
U.S. DIST. CT. VT. R. 16.3. 
123. Patent Law of China, supra note 96, at art. 57. 
124. Id. 
125. See id. at art. 56 (“The extent of protection of the patent right for invention or 
utility model shall be determined by the terms of the claims.  The description and 
the appended drawings may be used to interpret the claims.”). 
126. See supra notes 117–25 and accompanying text. 
127. Smith, supra note 83, at 659 & n.123 (citing Several Provisions of the Su-
preme People’s Court on Issues Relating to Application of Law to Adjudication of 
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In the United States, the courts are authorized to issue permanent 
or preliminary injunctions as well as damage awards.128  Damage 
awards are calculated by either assessing the lost profits incurred by 
the patent holder or by a reasonable royalty.129  Similar remedies 
exist in the Chinese system.  The administrative authority is appar-
ently given all of the powers of a Western judicial officer and may 
order an injunction or mediate the damage award.130  In addition, the 
patentee may apply for a preliminary injunction upon adequate 
showing “that the defendant is engaging or is likely to continue [to] 
engage in infringing activities and that irreparable harm will occur 
unless there is immediate intervention.”131  Damages are calculated 
via one of three methodologies.  The court may calculate damages 
according to the patentee’s actual losses, the infringer’s profits, or an 
appropriate multiple of the royalties of a hypothetical license.132 
Although a patentee may be able to protect her interest through 
the administrative and court systems, the Chinese system allows for 
an administrative determination of compulsory licensing—in effect, 
an involuntarily elimination of some of a patent holder’s rights.  A 
compulsory license significantly diminishes the rights of the patent 
holder by making his patent subject to exploitation by a third party 
regardless of whether the patent holder wishes to make his invention 
  
Cases of Patent Disputes arts. 9, 12 (promulgated by the Adjudication Comm. 
Supreme People’s Court, June 19, 2001), http://www.cpahkltd.com/Archives/ 
Several_Provisions2.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2009)). 
 
128. See generally MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 348–64. 
129. Id. at 356. 
130. Implementing Regulations, supra note 43, at R. 79; Patent Law of China, 
supra note 96, at art. 57.  The administrative authority mediates disputes over: (1) 
the right to apply for a patent and ownership of the patent right; (2) the qualifica-
tions of the inventor or creator; (3) remuneration owed to inventors or creators of 
service inventions; and (4) remuneration owed for the exploitation of an invention 
in the period of time after the patent application, but before the grant of the patent 
right.  Implementing Regulations, supra note 43, at R. 79; see also Smith, supra 
note 83, at 658 (“If the administrative authority determines that an infringement 
has occurred, he may order the infringer to stop the offending behavior.”). 
131. Smith, supra note 83, at 659 (citing Patent Law of China, supra note 96, at 
art. 61). 
132. See Patent Law of China, supra note 96, at art. 60. 
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available to the third party particularly or to the public generally.133  
In some instances there are limitations to the grant of a compulsory 
license.  The grant of a compulsory license generally occurs at least 
three years after the patent’s issuance.134  In addition, the potential 
exploiter must show proof of previous reasonable requests for licens-
ing135 and that such requests have been denied or ignored for a rea-
sonable period of time.136  Finally, if the compulsory license is 
granted, the exploiter will still have to pay an exploitation fee to the 
patent holder.137  Unsurprisingly, the Chinese system’s allowance for 
“compulsory license[s]”138 has caused concern to those who adhere 
to Western constructions of intellectual property rights.139 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Although an overview of the pertinent rules of provisions of each 
system indicates some relative harmony between the Chinese and   
U. S. patent law systems, the subtle differences allow for inferences 
as to the impetus behind the lack of enforcement.  All of the differ-
ences noted—the decreased bases of liability, the numerous de-
  
133. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 93, at 938 (defining a compul-
sory license as “[a] statutorily created license that allows certain people to pay a 
royalty and use an invention without the patentee‘s permission”). 
134. Implementing Regulations, supra note 43, at R. 72.  Note that “where the 
public interest so requires, the Patent Administration Department . . . may grant a 
compulsory license to exploit the patent for invention,” without concern for this 
limitation as Rule 72 of the Implementing Regulations applies to article 48, not 
article 49 of the Patent Law of China.  Patent Law of China, supra note 96, at art. 
49.   
135. Patent Law of China, supra note 96, at art. 51. 
136. Id. at art. 48. 
137. Id. at art. 54. 
138. See Implementing Regulations, supra note 43, at R. 72 (“After the expiration 
of three years from the date of the grant of the patent right, any entity may, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Article 48 of the Patent Law, request the Patent 
Administration Department under the State Council to grant a compulsory li-
cense.”). 
139. See Tony Chen & Ann. W. Chen, What Does the Third Amendment to Chi-
na's Patent Law Mean to Pharmaceutical Companies?, JONES DAY,  Aug. 2008, 
available at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S5415. 
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fenses, and the state control doctrines—point to the vestiges of the 
traditional understanding of intellectual property in China—that is, 
as more communal in nature rather than available for personal own-
ership.  In evaluating these provisions in light of the historical analy-
sis, there is agreement with those who believe that this communal 
conception of intellectual property was embossed on the Chinese 
culture, rather than an imposition of Communism on the current in-
tellectual property system.140  In addition, the historical analysis of 
the Treaty of 1903 indicates that, despite a positive economic and 
political climate, the successful implementation of an intellectual 
property regime appears to require more than the two aforemen-
tioned influences.141 
This is not to say the economic or political considerations are un-
important in understanding the driving force behind intellectual 
property enforcement.  Clearly, political stability and economic 
growth are important contributors to improving conditions in a de-
veloping country and are likely to move a developing country toward 
more protective policies with regard to intellectual property.  The 
Treaty of 1903 may not have caused sufficient economic growth and 
political stability, but it is difficult to determine what level of suffi-
ciency is necessary for intellectual property regime implementation.  
However, in attempting to understand the lack of enforcement in 
China, a growing economy and political stability are, as they possi-
bly were in 1903, already in place.  Therefore the question is: if 
China continues on its current trajectory economically and politi-
cally, will enforcement practices improve?  The methodology pro-
posed attempts to answer this question and appears, at first blush, to 
indicate that Chinese culture continues to strongly influence its laws 
and conception of intellectual property, and that it will delay, if not 
prohibit, effective intellectual property enforcement. 
Some have argued that, despite China’s unfamiliarity with patent 
law concepts, patience is all that is required to allow for better en-
forcement practices of China’s intellectual property laws.142  Truth-
fully, the Chinese patent system is ineffective against infringement 
  
140. See ALFORD, supra note 3, at 56. 
141. See supra Part III.A. 
142. See Allison & Lin, supra note 33, at 790. 
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when considered from a Western perspective, but any criticisms lev-
eled at the Chinese patent system are necessarily premised on the 
presumptions of Western intellectual property policies—policies 
which may not necessarily be the best solution to the goals that intel-
lectual property advocates hope to obtain.  Focusing on the cultural 
influences on Chinese patent law brings to the forefront the balance 
between individual ownership and property distribution policies cho-
sen by the Chinese after several attempted implementations.  Thus, it 
may be worth considering, rather than trying to force China to do 
something that it simply cannot, that China has possibly struck a 
balance between intellectual property rights and society’s needs that 
is clearly more in accordance with its own culture.  Furthermore, this 




143. Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1966) (“[Tho-
mas Jefferson] rejected a natural-rights theory in intellectual property rights and 
clearly recognized the social and economic rationale of the patent system.  The 
patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his 
discoveries.  Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowl-
edge.  The grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the creation of society—
at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas—and was not to be freely 
given.”). 
